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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD JENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 8369 
FRANK F. ~lOWER, 
Def.endant and Appellant. 
APPELLAN~r'S REPLY BRIEF 
STAr:rEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Brief made no mention of the injuries 
suffered h~r Respondent, as there is no issue in this Ap-
peal which make~ tlH· injuries material. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESUMED BY LAW TO BE A 
GUEST AND NOT A PASSENGER FOR HIRE, AND PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THAT PRESUMPTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
The following arguments raised 1n Respondent's 
Brief, to which we reply, are three fold. Respondent 
alleges: 
1. The inducement for the rides was the payment 
of $3.50 per week, and there was a binding contract be-
tween the parties, which establishes plaintiff as a pas-
senger for hire. 
2. The purpose of the rides was business, not 
social. 
3. There is no relationship between the Guest 
Statute and the Motor Vehicle Transportation chapter 
of the Public Utilities Act. 
Replying to the first argument above, we submit 
the following: 
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3 
Subsection (h) 54-6-12 (pg. 7, App. Brief) presup-
poses and indeed anticipates a "contract" between the 
employees to share the actual expenses. The terms of 
the "contract" are established by Statute, and the usual 
free enterprise of these parties, in this particular situa-
tion, has been eliminated by the legislature. 
Further, the "inducement" for the ride goes further 
beyond the plaintiff's payment of his proportion of the 
expenses; the inducement, more accurately, was the 
approval of the legislature to all employees, sanction-
ing the arrangement as long as they conducted themselves 
within the limitations set out in the exception outlined 
in subsection (h). 
Respondent, furthermore, has failed to carry the 
test to its conclusion, as overwhelmingly required by the 
authorities, and that is whether the driver and rider, by 
the "contract" understood, and the driver acquiesce in 
the understanding, that the riders would have a status 
which would entail the liability to a passenger for hire. 
(pg. 32, App. Brief) 
We reiterate our statement at page 33 of Appellant's 
Brief to clearly show that the parties, and particularly 
the defendant, "\vould certainly have no such understand-
ing. 
If all that were required to establish a passenger 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
status was the proof of a "contract," there would be very 
few instances wherein a rider would be a guest. 
If I "offer" to drive n1y wife to the grocery store 
and she "accepts," the elements of a contract are pre-
sent. And it t.akes little imagination to think of a "con-
sideration" sufficient in law to establish the entire "con~ 
tract" as binding and enforceable. But in the problem 
at bar, the element lacking, and necessary, is that cer-
tainly neither my wife nor I would understand, by the 
longest stretch of the imagination, that she would be a 
passenger for hire, rather than a guest. 
Everett vs. Burg, 301 :Mich. 734, 4 N. W. 2d 63, 
146 A.L.R. 639. 
"Practically every interchange of amenities 
and hospitality when very carefully analized, may 
appear to be a quid pro quo arrangement, but 
this does not prevent the relationship from being 
that of a host and guest." 
And in the Everett case above, the Michigan Su-
preme Court held that the agreement between 6 em-
ployees to share the rides to and from work, 5 of whom 
agreed to drive their cars in turn, and the 6th, who had 
no car, to pay a weekly sum to the driver, was "simply 
the exchange of amenities between employees." 
Respondent further contends that the arrangement 
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5 
between the parties was business and not social, and 
insists that proof of this is found in the fact that the 
parties had not met before the time the arrangement 
was made upon their first introduction by a fellow em-
ployee. 
Does Respondent then clain1 that friendship starts 
only after people who have been introduced have in fact 
known each other for a stated period of timeT Does the 
social nature of a relationship of two employees of a 
common employer start only when they have attended 
a social function together' Is it then untrue that the 
spark of friendship can not in fact ignite upon the first 
introduction 1 
What, in fact, is the nature of an automobile ride 
to and from employment 1 Is it a business trip in the 
true sense of the word~ The employees are not on duty 
while traveling to and from work, as evidenced by our 
Compensation Laws. The automobile expenses of the 
travel are not recognized by the Internal Revenue De-
partment of the Federal Government, as a deductible 
business expense. The State of Utah likewise, refuses 
such expense as deductible from income tax. The trips, 
then, if not truly "business trips," and if they n1ust be 
classified, can only be classified as social. 
Respondent insists, at page 6 of his Brief, that the 
test approved by the authorities cited, indicates that if 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the carriage tends to the promotion of n1utual interests 
of both p.assenger and driver, or if it is prirnarily for 
the attainment of some objective or purpose of the 
driver, the passenger is not a guest. 
In reciting the above argun1ent, Respondent has 
bitten his tongue. The rides are neither for the promo-
tion of their n1utual interests nor primarily for the ob-
jective of the defendant. The fellow mnployees had a 
common interest in getting to work, but they certainly 
had no mutual interest in so doing. For example, 
Wliliams had no "interest," other than perhaps friendly 
concern, that Mr. Gull be at work, as Mr. Williams would 
be paid, and would suffer no other detriment to himself, 
whether ~{r. Gull worked or not: And the same thing 
applies in reverse, and as between any two, or all of 
thr. occupants of the car. 
"'Mutual is not synonymous with "common." 
The latter word ... denotes that which is shared, 
in the same or different degrees, by two or more 
persons; but the former implies reciprocal action 
or interdependent connection." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 3rd. Ed. 
There is no more mutuality of interest in a group 
of employees riding to and from work together, than 
there would be if they were en route to or from a fishing 
trip, and had agreed in advance to share the actual 
expenses of the transportation. 
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Obviously the Respondent cannot claim that the 
trips were "primarily for the .attaimnent of some ob-
jective or purpose of the driver." The Legislature can-
not be accused of attempting to benefit the driver-em-
ployees as against the employees who ride. Their re-
fusal to allow the driver to make any profit, and their 
requirement that the drivers pay their share of the ex-
pense along with the riders, is conclusive against .any 
such contention. 
It needs no argument that the trips were not "pri-
marily for the purpose of getting the defendant to work," 
but rather, they were "primarily" and solely arranged to 
get everyone to and from work in as economical and 
convenient a manner as possible. 
The Respondent further argues to the effect that 
there is no relationship between the Guest and Motor 
Vehicle Transportation Acts. 
In the first place, we wish to correct Respondent on 
his understanding of our contentions, as recited in pages 
11 and 12 of his Brief. 
We certainly do not concede that had this accident 
occurred prior to 1948, plaintiff would have been a pas-
senger for hire. We submit that without the Statutory 
enactment in 1948, the Courts would be confronted with 
a closer problem as to whether, in fact, the sums agreed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
to be paid, in light with the other fact~, constituted 
•· c01npensation" under the meaning of the Gue~t Law. 
Furthennore, without the statutory exception (h), 
the parties conceivably would have been free to bargain 
with each other on the an1ount to be paid, which Inay or 
may not have constituted "compensation" under the 
particular facb. And under such conditions of freedom, 
the Court conceivably could take the position, as some 
Courts have, that any consideration, whether 1c or $5.00 
would constitute "compensation," inas1nuch as the Court 
generally will not inquire into the adequacy of the con-
sideration. 
Under those conditions, whether the driver did or 
did not secure a license from the Public Utilities Com-
mission would be as imm.aterial as whether or not he 
secured a driver's license. 
The obvious reply to Respondent's argument is that 
any two Laws, passed by a State Legislature, covering 
the subject of nwtor vehicles, can hardly disclaim rela-
tionship to each other when the facts either fall under 
one Statute or the other. The purposes and 1ne.aning 
of the Legislature, in passing each Act, 1nust then be 
inquired into. 
As one exan1ple only, The Safety Responsibility Act, 
Chapter 12, Title 41, U.C.A. 1953, ties the two above 
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~cts together, as far as "Relationship" is concerned. 
The Safety Responsibility Act, to use very general 
,erms, is a recognition by the Legislature that public 
)Olicy dictates that the public be protected for injuries 
>r damages suffered as a result of the ordinary neglig-
mce of motorists. 
The Public Utilities Act, for the same reason, re-
IUires financial responsibility on the part of operators 
)£ vehicles for hire. 
The guest Statute, 1n effect, provides that guests 
ln a vehicle shall assume the risk of the host's ordinary 
1egligence and, therefore, no financial responsibility, 
r1aturally, need be shown. 
Thereby lies the relationship. 
Did the Legislature then intend to protect the public, 
~xcept those employees riding to and from work? If 
Respondent's contentions are correct, that question would 
be answered in the affirmative, for the reasons; (again 
~peaking generally) 
1. The general public is protected for the negligence 
[)f the private motorist, who must carry liability insur-
mce. 
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2. Guests, however, 1nust assu1ne the risk, and, 
therefore, a fortiori, no insurance is required to protect 
them. 
3. Operators of vehicles for hire must carry 
liability insurance on the vehicle for hire. 
4. But employees, under subsection (h), need not 
carry insurance (except under 1 above), as they are not 
operating a vehicle for hire. 
There .are, of course, other reasons why there is 
a "relationship" between the two Acts in question, hut 
we will not belabor the obvious. 
On the other Points at issue, Appellant submits his 
appeal on his original Brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOllS E. MIDGLEY, 
Attor-ney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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